

Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5507

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 SANA 3721

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, YE
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 167901

1. U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP.

OUR INTERESTS IN YEMEN DERIVE FROM OUR ENORMOUS INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA. WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT YEMEN WILL NEVER BE USED AGAIN, AS IT WAS IN THE 60'S, AS A BASE OF MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE KINGDOM. WE WANT, SECOND, TO HELP YEMEN PLAY ITS NATURAL ROLE IN CONTAINING THE PDY THREAT TO ITSELF AND ALL THE PENINSULA, PARTICULARLY IN THE WAKE OF THE NEW COMMITMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA TO THE COMMUNIST RULERS IN ADEN. THE YEMENI ROLE IS A CRUCIAL PART OF A BROADER EFFORT TO REDRESS BALANCES IN THE HORN AND SHOW U.S. WILLINGNESS -- IN AFRICA AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST -- TO HELP FRIENDS. THIRD, SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN YEMEN -- WHERE IT IS FINANCED BY THE SAUDIS -- SERVES THESE TWO INTERESTS BY BINDING THE YAR TO ITS ERSTWHILE ANTAGONISTS IN THE KINGDOM AND ESTRANGING IT FROM ITS ERSTWHILE SUPPORTERS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT ALLOWS YEMEN TO FOLLOW AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY IN FACING SUBVERSION,
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PROPAGANDA, AND ARMED THREAT TO ITS AIR, WATER AND LAND. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SERVES OUR INTERESTS IN ANOTHER WAY, HOWEVER, WHICH IS MORE SUBTLE AND UNUSUAL. OUR INTERESTS IN THE BACKWARD YAR CONCERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE, EDUCATION, COMMERCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THESE, IN TURN, ARE BEST SERVED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. TRIBES AND TRADITIONALISM HAVE

BLOCKED THIS SORT OF GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST. A MILITARY WHICH CAN HELP THE GOVERNMENT EXTEND ITS SERVICES AND ITS AUTHORITY INTO THE HINTERLAND IS A NECESSARY PART OF MODERNIZATION.

2. HOST COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT.

A. YEMENIS SEE THE DANGER TO THEIR GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY COMING CHIEFLY FROM THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIETS, IN A SHIFT IN POLICY, TO SUPPORT COMMUNIST AND RADICAL ELEMENTS WITH CUBAN AND OTHER MILITARY ECHELONS PLUS UNLIMITED AMOUNTS OF MILITARY AID AGAINST NATIONALIST AND MODERATE ELEMENTS. SOVIETS USED TO BE WILLING TO SACRIFICE PARTY GROUPS TO NATIONALIST ONES. FAILURE OF THIS CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS APPARENTLY DISCREDITED THIS APPROACH IN SOVIET EYES, ACCORDING TO YEMENIS. YEMENIS THINK SOVIET SHIFT HAS BEEN ABETTED BY THEIR EXPANDING INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, PLUS, MOST IMPORTANT, THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. A FUTURE NEED FOR OIL THEMSELVES, A DESIRE TO DENY IT TO OTHERS, AND A WISH TO PROJECT THEIR POWER OVER THE AFRICAN CONTINENT ALL ACCOUNT IN PART IN THE EYES OF YEMENIS FOR THE DANGEROUS NEW STRATEGY OF AGGRESSION. TACTICLY SPEAKING, YEMENI CONCERN IS (1) MATTER OF RESPECT FOR CUBAN FORCES, (2) CONCERN ABOUT PDRY-YAR RATIOS (THREE OR FOUR TIMES AS MANY MEN IN SOUTHERN CONFIDENTIAL

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ARMY, SAME RATIO OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT), (3) MEMORIES OF HARD BATTLES FOUGHT WHEN MUCH WEAKER PDRY LAUNCHED GUERRILLA WAR IN CENTRAL PROVINCES OF YAR DURING 1972-74, AND (4) CONCERN ABOUT U.S. OR SAUDI DEPENDABILITY IN EVENT OF FIGHTING. SCENARIO YAR LEADERS ENVISION IS GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN CENTRAL PROVINCES AND EAST OF YEMEN, FOLLOWED BY CROSS-BORDER RAIDS WHICH WOULD ESCALATE WHEN YAR FORCES RESPOND. TERRORISM, POLITICAL ACTION AND PROPAGANDA WOULD ALL BE USED AGAINST LARGER BUT MORE BACKWARD YAR, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTHERN REGIONS OF YAR WHERE CONSIDERABLE ANIMOSITY EXISTS AGAINST NORTHERN AND TRIBAL REGIONS OF COUNTRY.

B. YAR STRATEGIES TO MEET THREAT ARE, AT MOMENT THIS DRAFT, STILL UNSETTLED DUE TO LACK OF ANY DETAILED OFFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM USG AND SAUDI ARABIA. OFFER IS NOW UNDER PREPARATION AND EXPECTED IN SANA IN NEXT TWO WEEKS OR SO. TACTIC IS BASICALLY FORWARD DEFENSE, INVOLVING REORGANIZATION OF YAR ARMY, WITH EXTENSIVE MODERNIZATION AND RETRAINING PLUS DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORTING STRUCTURE. YEMENIS WANT HELP IN THIS EFFORT TO COME FROM SAUDIS AND WEST, BUT FEEL THAT UNTIL SUCH HELP MATERIALIZES, THEY CAN'T CUT THEIR TIES WITH SOVIETS. LATTER CONTINUE OFFER TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH

THEY CLEARLY PREFER SOUTH AND ARE PREPARED WORK AGAINST NORTH FROM LARGE EMBASSY, MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN SANA. SOME YEMENIS FAVOR GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH NOW IN POLITICAL DISARRAY. COUPLED TO THESE OPEN AND CLANDESTINE MILITARY EFFORTS WHICH YAR INTENDS UNDERTAKE IS DIPLOMATIC ONE -- TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF SOUTH, DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION, UNCERTAIN POLITICAL POSITION OF NEW REGIME IN ADEN AND CONDEMNATION OF ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN FORCES. HOPE IS THAT NEW GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE, TIME IN WHICH YAR CAN STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSES, PERHAPS INDUCE SPLITS IN RULING GROUPS IN ADEN.

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TIME CAN ALSO BE USED AROUSE INTEREST IN MORE POWERFUL NEIGHBORS -- LIKE OMAN, EGYPT, IRAN, JORDAN, SAUDIS, OTHERS -- TO EXTEND IDEA OF REGIONAL COOPERATION TO INCLUDE DEFENSE OF YEMEN. YAR POLICY ALSO GIVES DUE PRIORITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INFORMATION PROGRAMS, POLITICAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF YAR IN FACE OF THREAT.

C. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT IN COUNTRY AS WEAK AND DIVIDED AS YAR, THERE IS ANOTHER BODY OF OPINION THAT HOLDS TO IDEA OF ACCOMMODATING SOVIETS, KEEPING TIES WITH SAUDIS AND WEST LOOSE AND SEEKING NEW DIALOGUE WITH PDRY UNDER RUBRIC OF YEMENI UNITY. FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT, THIS IS NOT POLICY BUT COULD BECOME FALL-BACK POSITION IF AID DOESN'T MATERIALIZE FROM SAUDIS AND WEST.

3. MISSION PERCEPTION OF THREAT.

IT IS HARD TO KNOW HOW MUCH TO DEPRECIATE BLOODY-

MINDED YAR ANALYSIS WHEN PDRY WENT TO EXTRAORDINARY LENGTH
OF KILLING PRESIDENT IN SAND BY TERRORIST WHO ACCEPTED
SUICIDE ON BEHALF OF PARTY. SOME DEPRECIATION IS IN ORDER,
HOWEVER. SOVIETS -- AND THEIR PARTY FRIENDS IN SOUTH --
CLEARLY THOUGHT FORMER PRESIDENT IN SOUTH WAS CONSPIRING
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FOR SOME KIND OF YAR AND SAUDI AID IN EFFORT TO WEAKEN
PARTY, TURN OUT ITS LEADERS. IT CAN BE ARGUED THEY ACTED
DEFENSIVELY, CREATED GREAT DISARRAY IN THEIR OWN RANKS IN
PROCESS, WON'T RECOVER FOR LONG TIME, WON'T LAUNCH EFFORT
AGAINST NORTH FOR LONGER TIME. CONCLUSION OF THIS ANALYSIS
IS, HOWEVER, THAT THREAT WILL EMERGE IN LONG TERM -- YEAR
OR TWO -- RATHER THAN IN SHORT TERM. LEADERS OF SOUTHERN
PARTY ARE COMMUNIST, NOT NATIONALIST. THEY SEEK EXPORT
REVOLUTION. SOVIETS MAY, LIKE THEIR CLIENTS IN ADEN, BE
CALCULATING AND CAUTIOUS, BUT THEY WANT OVERTURN
STATUS QUO IN AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, AND CAN COUNT
MANY MORE SUCCESSES IN FOSTERING ARMED CONFLICT RATHER
THAN IN DIPLOMACY OF COMMON INTEREST. THUS, WITH FEW
CAVEATS, MISSION LARGELY ACCEPTS YAR ANALYSIS.

4. TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HOST COUNTRY BELIEVES
IT NEEDS TO MEET THREAT.

YAR PRESIDENT SEEKS MILITARY WHICH IS EQUAL IN
MATERIAL AND NUMBERS TO THAT OF MUCH SMALLER PDRY. HE
SEEKS MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SAUDIS
AND OTHER FRIENDS WHICH EQUIVALENT TO THOSE PROVIDED PDRY
BY CUBA AND USSR. HE WANTS BUILD-UP, MOREOVER, AT SPEED
OF ONE IN ETHIOPIA. HE IS PAINFULLY AWARE THAT MEASURES
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF NORTH WILL ELICIT OFFSETTING NEW
HELP FOR SOUTH.

5. ASSESSMENT OF ABOVE IN VIEW U.S. INTERESTS IN ALTERNATIVES.

A. UNLESS PRESSED VERY HARD, IT IS NOT IN U.S.
INTERESTS TO CHALLENGE SOVIET UNION HEAD-ON ACROSS REMOTE
YAR BORDER WITH ARMY FORMED BY POTENTIALLY UNSTABLE AND
INCOMPETENT GOVERNMENT IN SANA. ALTERNATIVES ARE TO USE
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TIME WHICH EVENTS IN SOUTH HAVE PROVIDED TO BUILD UP YAR
DEFENSES TO DETER ATTACK FROM SOUTH AND MAKE IT COSTLY AND
POTENTIALLY WIDESPREAD IF IT OCCURS. THIS REQUIRES NEW
WEAPONS AND NEW U.S. ROLE IN TRAINING AND ADVICE. ON OTHER

HAND, IF PDRY APPEARS DETERMINED TO PRESS SUBVERSION AND ATTACKS ON YAR, IT WOULD BE RUINOUS TO OUR POSITION IN SAUDI ARABIA AND WHOLE OF PENINSULA TO DEPEND ON SUCH PARTIAL MEASURES.

B. ALTERNATIVES FOR MOMENT FORTUNATELY PROMISE NOT ONLY TO BE SUCCESSFUL BUT TO BE MORE PRACTICAL, GIVEN SHORTAGES OF SKILLS IN YAR AND WEAKNESS OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION.

C. POST WOULD THUS ENDORSE YAR STRATEGY AND TACTICS MENTIONED EARLIER, WITH EXCEPTION OF CLANDESTINE WARFARE, EQUIVALENT FORCES, STATIONING OF FOREIGN FORCES IN YAR.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING.

A. BUDGET FIGURES FOR FY 79, PUBLISHED THIS WEEK IN SANA, SHOW YR 3.1 BILLION (\$680 MILLION) EXPENSES. THERE ARE NO FIGURES TO SHOW DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS, WHICH WERE REPORTED LAST YEAR TO BE ABOUT 25 PERCENT. WITH TWO CHIEF OF STATE ASSASSINATIONS SINCE LAST YEAR'S BUDGET WAS ANNOUNCED, CIVILIAN MINISTRIES HAVE LAPSED BADLY IN THEIR SPENDING PLANS AND INCREASED SUMS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY. THE LATTER ALSO HAS UNBUDGETED FUNDS, BOTH FROM THE SAUDIS AND FROM YAR SOURCES, AND TRADITIONALLY HAVE NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN BUDGET FIGURES, UNLIKE CIVILIAN EQUIPMENT WHICH COMES AS GRANTS IN AID. THUS, REAL MILITARY AND SECURITY SPENDING IS MUCH LARGER THAN LAST YEAR'S ANNOUNCED TOTAL OF \$120 MILLION. IT IS, HOWEVER,

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A STEADILY SHRINKING PART OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES AND GNP. BUDGET FIGURES ACCURATELY REFLECT A TREND WHEN THEY CLAIM DEFENSE SPENDING SHRANK FROM 44 PERCENT OF

THE YAR BUDGET TO 25 PERCENT IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS. (DEVELOPMENT SPENDING IN THE SAME PERIOD CLIMBED FROM 18 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET TO 25 PERCENT.) DEFENSE SPENDING ALSO GREW LESS RAPIDLY THAN GNP, BUT THE LATTER IN YEMEN IS NOTORIOUSLY UNCERTAIN. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO DEBT SERVICE -- LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF BUDGET -- AND THERE ARE VERY HIGH OFFICIAL FOREIGN RESERVES -- OVER \$1.3 BILLION.

7. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT.

A. PDRY ARSENALS ALREADY INCLUDE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES, WHICH EXCEED THE VULCAN IN COST, SOPHISTICATION, EFFECTIVENESS AND POLITICAL IMPACT. THE FOUR F-5B'S SCHEDULED FOR INTRODUCTION HERE BY SEPTEMBER HARDLY MATCH THE 45 MIG-21'S ALREADY IN PLACE IN THE SOUTH, NOR DO THE MOTLEY 20 PLUS YAR MIG-17'S POSE A THREAT, EVEN IF MAINTAINED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY MISSION, TO THE 50 OR SO EQUIVALENT FIGHTERS IN PDRY. OTHER NEW U.S. EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED INCLUDE M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, HARDLY A WEAPON TO TIP THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND

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NEW RADARS OF SORT ALREADY IN PLACE IN SOUTH. PROGRAM, WHICH WE PRESENTLY PROPOSE TO ACCELERATE, PROVIDES FOR SIX YAR BRIGADES, VERSUS ELEVEN NOW ORGANIZED IN SOUTH; PROGRAM HAS NO RPT NO ARMOR AND FEATURES ONLY WORLD WAR TWO TYPE WEAPONS -- 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS, 81 MM MORTARS; 105 MM HOWITZERS AND LAW'S. THIS PROGRAM IS HARDLY DESTABILIZING; IT MAY NOT EVEN BE STABILIZING.

9. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

A. SAUDI ARABIA PAYS VIRTUALLY ALL COSTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT -- DEPOTS, AIRFIELDS, ETC. -- WHICH CONTEMPLATED FOR YAR. IT PAYS FOR ALL U.S. EQUIPMENT; USG PROVIDES LITTLE MORE THAN HALF MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN IMET FUNDS. INCLUDING FRENCH EQUIPMENT BELOW, WE ESTIMATE SAUDI PAYMENTS FOR MILITARY AID TO YAR TO RUN AT ABOUT \$700 MILLION AT MOST FOR PERIOD 1976-80. SAUDIS CLAIM THAT ALREADY COMMITTED PROGRAMS COME TO BILLION DOLLARS BUT WE CAN'T FIND OUT HOW.

B. ECONOMIC AID OF SAUDIS IS AT LEAST \$1.5 BILLION FOR SAME FIVE YEAR PERIOD, ACCORDING TO OUR ESTIMATE. SAUDIS SAY IT IS WELL OVER \$2 BILLION.

C. ECONOMIC AID OF OTHER DONORS -- FROM WORLD BANK IN PART BUT MOSTLY FROM OTHER ARAB DONORS -- MAY COME TO \$400 MILLION. MILITARY AID FROM OTHER SOURCES IN PERIOD UNDER QUESTION IS SMALL, PERHAPS \$30 MILLION.

D. SOVIET MILITARY AID IN PERIOD IS LARGER, PERHAPS
\$100 MILLION. SOVIET MILITARY AID IN LAST THREE
YEARS -- WE DON'T EXPECT ANY AID IN FUTURE -- INCLUDES
50 HEAVY TANKS, 18 OLD MIG'S, SOME ANTI-AIRCRAFT
GUNS INCLUDING SOME ZSU TYPES AND PATROL BOATS.

E. FRENCH SALES -- AGAIN PAID FOR BY SAUDIS --
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INCLUDE 239 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND ARMORED
CARS, SOME COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PERHAPS, IN NEW
ORDERS WHICH RUMORED BUT NOT YET CONFIRMED, SOME AMX-30
TANKS AND SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES.

10. WITH DETAILS ON NEW U.S. EFFORTS STILL UNCERTAIN,
TOGETHER WITH CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OF WHAT SAUDIS
MIGHT DO SEPARATELY, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO PROJECT
DIFFERENT PACKAGES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
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